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1 Introduction
We study a citizen candidate model with private information about the candidates
preferred policies (or, ideal points). By contrast, in the seminal models of Osborne and
Slivinski (OS 1996) and Besley and Coate (BC 1997), and most citizen candidate models
that have followed, the candidatesideal points are assumed to be common knowledge.
In the baseline model, a community is about to elect a new leader to implement a policy
decision. Each citizen may enter the electoral competition as a candidate at some
commonly known cost. Because each candidates preferred policy is public information,
she cannot credible promise any other than this policy in case of being elected.
Anticipating this, citizens prefer the candidate whose ideal point is closest to their own
ideal point, possibly themselves. OS assume a continuum of citizens (i.e., potential
candidates) and sincere voting. That is, citizens vote for the most preferred candidate.
BC assume a nite number of citizens and strategic voting (i.e., a Nash equilibrium in
undominated strategies for the voting game). They identify a variety of di¤erent kinds
of equilibria supporting di¤erent numbers of entrants, and show how the set of equilibria
depends on the distribution of ideal points as well as the entry costs and benets from
holding o¢ ce. For most environments, there are multiple equilibria. Both median and
non-median policy outcomes can be supported in equilibrium.
The citizen candidate model makes an important departure from the
Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition because it provides a framework to
address questions of endogenous entry of candidates (or parties) when these candidates
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have preferences over policy outcomes.1 Importantly, in this model the conguration of
equilibrium candidate policies must resist the potential entry of any citizen as a
candidate, given the restrictions on the entry costs and spoils of o¢ ce. Moreover,
standard spatial competition models assume candidates without own ideal points and let
them oat in the policy space in order to maximize their chances of being elected. By
contrast, in the baseline model, citizen candidates have their own ideal points and these
coincide with their policy promises.
However, the assumption of common knowledge about citizen candidatesideal
points is restrictive. For example, it seems to be common that candidatesstands on
issues that are not yet foreseen (e.g., unexpected outbreaks of conicts) are uncertain,
and the community may observe unexpected policy decisions when these issues come up.
Moreover, extremist candidates may have strong incentives to disguise their actual
preferences until they are in power. For example, after becoming the leader of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev surprised many of his
comrades with a policy that opened up for the West. In this paper we study such
uncertainties by introducing private information about citizen candidatesideal points.
This approach has another advantage in that it has sharp predictions: citizen candidate
models typically su¤er from multiple equilibria and do not have clean empirical
predictions.2
1The citizen candidate models have their roots in the earlier work on strategic entry, models related to
Duvergerslaw, and models with policy motivated candidates. See for example Palfrey (1984), Wittman
(1983), Palfrey (1989), Feddersen et al. (1990), Feddersen (1992), and Osborne (1993).
2See for example Roemer (2004), Dhillon and Lockwood (2002), and the references they cite.
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In this paper we develop a citizen candidate model with a nite (possibly small)
number of citizens whose ideal points are iid draws from a continuous uniform
distribution on the policy space and private information. We look at symmetric
equilibria in the entry stage of the model, and prove that they always exist and are
always unique. There is never a symmetric equilibrium with only moderatetypes
entering (moderate in the sense of smaller distances between their ideal points and the
median ideal point, as compared to extremetypes). The equilibrium has the property
that if a citizen enters if her ideal point is x, then she also enters when her ideal point is
more extreme than x. This unique equilibrium implies a unique probability distribution
of the number of entrants, and we are able to obtain comparative statics about how this
distribution changes with the underlying parameters of the model: community size,
entry costs, and benets from holding o¢ ce. As the entry costs increase or the benets
from holding o¢ ce decrease, there are fewer entrants in the sense of rst order stochastic
dominance, and the candidates are more extreme on average. As the number of citizens
increases, candidates are again more extreme on average but the e¤ect on the number or
entrants is ambiguous. A more general account of our citizen candidate model with
private information is given in Großer and Palfrey (2008), where various symmetric and
asymmetric distributions of ideal points and other extensions are analyzed.
Several papers have begun to explore the e¤ects of uncertainty on citizen candidate
equilibria, in several di¤erent ways. Due to space constraints in this volume, we can only
mention some relevant literature. Eguia (2007) allows for uncertain turnout and shows
how this can reduce somewhat the set of equilibria in the BC model. Fey (2007) uses
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the Poisson game approach to study entry where there is an uncertain number of
citizens. Brusco and Roy (2007) add aggregate uncertainty, allowing for shifts in the
distribution of ideal points. Casamatta and Sand-Zantman (2005) study a model with
private information and three types of citizens, and analyze the asymmetric equilibria of
the resulting coordination game. Osborne et al. (2000) present a model, though not a
citizen candidate model, where extreme types participate in costly meetings.
Section 2 describes our citizen candidate model with private information and a
uniform distribution of ideal points. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the
model. Section 4 derives comparative statics, and illustrates these using some examples
with specic parameter values. Section 5 briey discusses concave payo¤ functions.
Section 6 discusses possible extensions and concludes.
2 The Model
A community of n  2 citizens is electing a leader to implement a policy decision. The
policy space is represented by the [ 1; 1] interval of the real line. Each citizen,
i = 1; :::; n, has preferences over policies, which are represented by a utility function that
is linearly decreasing in the Euclidean distance between the policy decision and her ideal
point, xi 2 [ 1; 1]  R. An individuals ideal point is private information, so only citizen
i knows xi. Ideal points are uniformly distributed according to the continuous
cumulative distribution function F , with F (x) = 1+x
2
; x 2 [ 1; 1]  R, and this
distribution is common knowledge. The game for implementing a policy decision
proceeds in four stages. In the rst stage (Entry), all citizens decide simultaneously and
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independently on whether to bear the entry cost c  0 and run for o¢ ce, ei = 1, or not
run, ei = 0. The number of citizen candidates is denoted by m 
Pn
i=1 ei. In the second
stage (Policy promises), each candidate publicly announces a non-binding policy
promise. If m = 0, a default policy, , is implemented according to a commonly known
(possibly stochastic) procedure, . In the third stage (Voting), each citizen i makes a
costless decision on whether to abstain from voting or to vote for one of the candidates,
possibly for herself. The new leader is determined by simple majority rule (with random
tie breaking) and announced publicly. In the nal stage (Policy decision), the leader
implements a policy  2 [ 1; 1]  R. Then, each citizen is total payo¤ in the game is
given by
i (xi; ; ei; wi) =   jxi   j   cei + bwi, (1)
where wi = 1 if citizen i is elected as the new leader, in which case she receives private
benets from holding o¢ ce, b  0. If citizen i is not the new leader, then wi = 0. We
assume that citizens maximize their own expected payo¤s and face identical entry costs,
c, and leadership benets, b.
3 Political equilibrium
To solve our citizen candidate model with private information, we use sequential
equilibrium (henceforth political equilibrium) and consider behavioral strategies (Kuhn
1953) for each information set. Our theoretical analysis starts with policy promises,
voting, and policy decisions before we proceed in more detail with the citizensdecisions
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on whether or not to run for o¢ ce.
Lemma 1 (Policy promises, voting, and policy decisions) In any political equilibrium,
(i) policy promises are cheap talk; (ii) each citizen candidate is elected with equal
probability of 1
m
; and (iii) the new leader implements her ideal point,  = xi.
Proof. (iii): The only credible policy choice of a new leader is to implement her ideal
point,  = xi, yielding her a zero payo¤ loss,   jxi   j = 0. (i): If there is only one
candidate, her policy promise is irrelevant because she will be elected anyway (at least
she will vote for herself; see below). If there are two or more candidates, their policy
promises are not credible because each candidate has an incentive to increase her
chances of being elected by misrepresenting her ideal point (recall that promises are
non-binding and preferences are private information). Thus, policy promises are cheap
talk. (ii): Then, each non-candidate is indi¤erent between the candidates because she
cannot distinguish among their ideal points. Thus, she either abstains from voting or
votes for any of the candidates. Moreover, each candidate prefers herself to any other
candidate (whose ideal points she cannot distinguish either). This is because any others
ideal point yields her a strict payo¤ loss with probability one. Thus, each candidate
votes for herself.3
3Note that the policy promises and voting stages do not demand any particular decision structure.
Specically, lemma 1 holds for any sequence of decisions and information about these decisions. Also
note that voting equilibria exist in which some candidates have larger probabilities of being elected than
others. However, our model rules out any kind of coordination prior to entry decisions and, hence, ex
ante each candidate has an equal probability of becoming the new leader.
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Lemma 1 greatly simplies the equilibrium analysis in the entry stage, to which we
turn next. We focus on equilibria in symmetric cutpoint strategies, dened by
ei =
8>><>>:
0 if jxij < x
1 if jxij  x;
(2)
where the cutpoint x represents a pair of cutpoint policies (xl; xr) with xl  0  xr (i.e.,
the subscripts denote their relative positions left and right, respectively) and
x = jxlj = xr 2 [0; 1] 2 R (i.e., the cutpoint policies are symmetric around x = 0). In
words, the symmetric cutpoint strategy, ei, determines that all citizens with ideal points
equally and more extremethan x run for o¢ ce, and all citizens with ideal points more
moderatethan x do not run.
To derive the equilibrium cutpoint policy, x, we must compare a citizen is
expected payo¤s as both a candidate and a non-candidate, given the equilibrium
decisions in subsequent stages. Then, citizen is expected payo¤ for entering, ei = 1, is
E[i j ei = 1] = xn 1 b
+
nX
m=2

n  1
m  1

(1  x)m 1xn m

b
m
+
m  1
m
E[  jxi   j j x]

  c; (3)
where Pr(jxij  x) = 1  x and Pr(jxij < x) = x, for our F (x) = 1+x2 ; x 2 [ 1; 1]  R.
Moreover, assuming without loss of generality that xi  0, is expected payo¤ loss if not
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being elected is given by
E [jxi   j j x] = 1
2
R  x
 1
1
2
jxi   xj dx
F ( x) +
1
2
R 1
x
1
2
jxi   xj dx
1  F (x) (4)
=
1
4(1  x)
2664  jxi + xj2 + jxi + 1j2 + jxi   1j2
+ jxi   xj2 
8>><>>:
 1 if 0  xi < x
1 if 0  x  xi
3775
for x 2 [0; 1);
which accounts for the possibility that the expected policy decision lies in the left or
right direction, l or r respectively, with equal probability of one half for each. Note
that the default policy takes e¤ect if x = 1. The rst term in expression (3) gives the
case where i receives b because she is the only candidate, which occurs with probability
xn 1. The second term gives the cases where m  1  1 candidates enter in addition to
herself, which occurs with probability

n  1
m  1

(1  x)m 1xn m and yields her expected
leadership benets of b
m
. The summation accounts for all possible m = 2; :::; n.
Moreover, i will not be elected with probability m 1
m
and her expected payo¤ loss for this
event is E [jxi   j j x], given in expression (4). Finally, i bears the entry costs, c,
independent of how many other candidates enter, which gives the third term in
expression (3).
In contrast, citizen is expected payo¤ for not entering, ei = 0, is
E[i j ei = 0] = xn 1 E[  jxi   j j x]
+
nX
m=2

n  1
m  1

(1  x)m 1xn m E [  jxi   j j x] : (5)
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The rst term corresponds to the event where, as herself, no other citizen runs for o¢ ce,
which occurs with probability xn 1. In this paper, we assume for simplicity that the
default policy  = 0 takes e¤ect. This leads to a very simple expression for payo¤ losses
in the no-entry event, which is independent of x:
E[jxi   j j x] = jxij: (6)
Note that for x = 0 the default policy is irrelevant, because all citizens enter. The
remaining terms in expression (5) correspond to the events where m  1  1 other
citizens choose to enter. In contrast to expression (3), b does not appear in these terms
because i does not enter and therefore never wins.
Finally, it is readily veried that relating expressions (3) and (5) and rearranging
yields the best response entry strategy for a citizen with ideal point xi if all other
citizens are using cutpoint strategy e, which is to enter if and only if4
xn 1 [b+ jxij] +
nX
m=2

n  1
m  1

(1  x)m 1xn m 1
m
[b+ E [jxi   j j x]]  c; (7)
where the left-hand and right-hand sides (henceforth LHS and RHS, respectively) give
citizen is expected net benets and costs from running for o¢ ce, respectively. We can
use this condition, and our assumptions stated above, to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium entry) There always exists a political equilibrium with a
unique symmetric cutpoint policy, x, where each citizen i with jxij  x enters the
electoral competition as a candidate, ei = 1, and each citizen i with jxij < x does not
4We assume, without loss of generality, that indi¤erent citizen types choose to enter.
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enter, ei = 0. This cutpoint policy is characterized by the following necessary and
su¢ cient conditions:
(i) If c  c  1
n

b+ 1
2

, then x = 0 and ei = 1;8i ("every citizen enters", or m = n);
(ii) If c  c  b+ 1, then x = 1 and ei = 0;8i ("no citizen enters", or m = 0);
(iii) If c < c < c, then x 2 (0; 1) and some citizens are expected to enter (or
m 2 [0; n]), where x is determined by
(x)n 1 [b+ x] +
nX
m=2

n  1
m  1

(1  x)m 1 (x)n m  1
m

b+
1 + x
2

= c: (8)
Proof. We give a sketch here (details are in Großer and Palfrey 2008). Recall our
assumptions F (x) = 1+x
2
; x 2 [ 1; 1]  R; n  2; c  0; and b  0. First, we show that
(i) to (iii) give su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium cutpoint strategy, e, to exist. To
do so, consider LHS(7) and note that a change in xi may only a¤ect jxij and
E [jxi   j j x], but no other term. Observe that LHS(7) is strictly increasing in
xi 2 [0; 1] unless xi = x = 0, in which case it does not change in xi (this is a situation
where everyone enters anyway). This proves that (i) to (iii) provide su¢ cient conditions
for an equilibrium cutpoint strategy, e, to exist. In fact, because this holds for any x,
this establishes that any symmetric equilibrium is in cutpoint strategies. This leads to
three possible situations.
(i): If LHS(7) is equal to or greater than c for all values of xi and x, then the
unique equilibrium is for all n citizens to enter. This corresponds to an equilibrium
cutpoint policy x = 0. Thus, for this to hold, we simply set x = 0 and xi = 0 and have
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only to consider the term m = n in LHS(7). The inequality condition (7) reduces to
1
n
(b+ E [jx   j j x = 0]) = 1
n

b+
1
2

 c  c:
Thus, there is universal entry if and only if c  1
n

b+ 1
2

.
(ii): If LHS(7) is less than or equal to c for all values of xi and x, then the unique
equilibrium is for no citizen to enter. This corresponds to an equilibrium cutpoint policy
x = 1. Thus, for this to hold, we simply set x = 1 and xi = 1. The inequality condition
(7) changes and reduces to
b+ E[jx   j j x = 1] = b+ 1  c  c:
Thus, there is zero entry if and only if c  1 + b (note that the probability that any
citizen has an ideal point xi = 1 is equal to zero).
(iii): If neither boundary condition in (i) or (ii) hold, then we have an equilibrium
with an interior cutpoint, x 2 (0; 1). Note rst that equilibrium condition (8) is the
same as equation (7); except substituting xi = x and noticing that E [jx  j j x] = 1+x2 .
Next, observe that LHS(8) is continuous on x 2 [ 1; 1] because ideal points are
distributed continuously, and it is strictly increasing in x 2 (0; 1). This proves that
x 2 (0; 1) is unique, because LHS(8) and RHS(8) can intersect at most once. To see
that this equilibrium exists, recall that x = 0 yields c and x = 1 yields c and note that
c = 1
n

b+ 1
2

< b+ 1 = c for n  2 and b  0. Thus, for any c 2 (c; c) there exists a
unique interior equilibrium, x 2 (0; 1), according to condition (8).
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4 Comparative statics
In this section, we turn to the comparative statics regarding the e¤ects of changes in
n; c; and b on x when we are in a region of the parameter space where the solution is
interior, i.e., x 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics) The interior symmetric equilibrium cutpoint
policy, x 2 (0; 1), is strictly increasing in the number of citizens, n, and the entry costs,
c; and it is strictly decreasing in the benets from holding o¢ ce, b. An increase in x
implies that, on average, candidates and policy outcomes become more extreme. It also
implies a decrease in expected entry when caused by changes in c and b.
Proof. See Großer and Palfrey (2008).
Proposition 2 states that candidates and policy outcomes are, on average, more
extreme in larger communities. It is also a straightforward exercise to show that
lim
n!1
x(n) = 1. That is, in very large electorates, only the most extreme citizens will
throw their hat in the ring. Of course, this does not imply there is zero entry! The
limiting distribution of the number of entrants is fully characterized in Großer and
Palfrey (2008).
Proposition 2 does not give a comparative static result about the expected number
of entrants as a function of the number of citizens, n. In contrast to the increases in the
expected number of entrants when c and b change, an increase in the number of citizens
can yield either more entry or less entry, on average. To see this, notice that there are
two e¤ects on entry that result from increasing from n to n+ 1. First, there is the direct
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e¤ect that the number of potential candidates (i.e., citizens) has increased by 1. This
e¤ect works to increase entry. The second e¤ect is an indirect equilibrium e¤ect, namely
that x(n+ 1; c; b) > x(n; c; b), and this goes in the opposite direction. I.e., there is one
more potential entrant, but each citizen now enters with a lower probability. Which
term dominates will depend on n, c, and b.
5 Examples
We next use specic parametric examples of the uniformly distributed ideal points, xi,
with F (x) = 1+x
2
; x 2 [ 1; 1]  R, to illustrate graphically the key equilibrium
properties of our citizen candidate model with private information.
5.1 Variations in the costs of entry, c
To illustrate our comparative statics results for changes in the costs of entry, this
example uses n = 5 and b = 0 and varies the costs between c = 0:10, 0:25, 0:45, and 1.
Figure 1 gives the cutpoint policies xl 2 [ 1; 0] and xr 2 [0; 1] on the horizontal axis and
the expected net benets and costs from entering as a candidate on the vertical axis
(i.e., LHS(8) and RHS(8), respectively). Expected net benets are represented by the
U-shaped curve and the various costs by horizontal lines.
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-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c = 0.10
c = 0.25
c = 0.45
c = 1.00
 Expected net benefits and costs
Cutpoint policies
Figure 1: Symmetric cutpoint policy equilibria and variations in entry costs, c, for
n = 5 and b = 0.
The symmetric cutpoint policy equilibria for the various costs, x(c) 2 [0; 1], are
determined by the intersections of the expected net benets curve and the respective
cost lines. These equilibria are increasing in c, where x(c = 0:10) = 0,
x(c = 0:25) = 0:455, x(c = 0:45) = 0:713, and x(c = 1) = 1. Note that
c = 1
5

0 + 1
2

= 0:1 and c = 0+ 1 = 1 for the limit cutpoint policies 0 and 1, respectively
(recall from proposition 1 (i) and (ii) that everyone enters if c  c and no one enters if
c  c). Finally, as a consequence of the increasing x in c, expected policy outcomes in
each direction left and right become more extreme (minus and plus 0:5, 0:727, 0:857,
and 1 for our ascending c, respectively) and expected entry decreases (5, 2:726, 1:434,
and 0, respectively).5
5Expected policy outcomes in each direction left and right are derived as E[l j xl] = xl 12 and
E[r j xr] = xr+12 , respectively, and expected entry is derived as E[m j x] = n(1  x).
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5.2 Variations in the spoils of o¢ ce, b
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
3
b = 0
b = 1
b = 2
 Expected net benefits and costs
Cutpoint policies
Figure 2: Symmetric cutpoint policy equilibria and variations in the benets from
holding o¢ ce, b, for n = 5 and c = 0:45.
Here, we demonstrate our comparative statics results for changes in the benets from
holding o¢ ce. The example uses n = 5 and c = 0:45 and varies the spoils between
b = 0; 1; and 2. Figure 2 shows that x decreases in b, where x(b = 0) = 0:713 and
x(b = 1) = 0:276 (cf. the intersections of the respective net benets curves and the cost
line) and x(b = 2) = 0 (because the respective net benets curve lies above the cost
line). Finally, this decrease yields more moderate expected policy outcomes in each
direction left and right (minus and plus 0:857, 0:638, and 0:5 for our ascending b,
respectively) and raises expected entry (1:434, 3:618, and 5, respectively).
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5.3 Variations in the number of citizens, n
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
n = 50
n = 20
n = 5
 Expected net benefits and costs
Cutpoint policies
Figure 3: Symmetric cutpoint policy equilibria and variations in the number of
citizens, n, for c = 0:45 and b = 0.
The nal example illustrates our comparative statics results for changes in the size of
the community. It uses b = 0 and c = 0:45 and varies the number of citizens between
n = 5; 20; and 50. Figure 3 shows that x increases in n, where x(n = 5) = 0:713;
x(n = 20) = 0:912, and x(n = 50) = 0:963, respectively (once again, cf. the
intersections of the respective net benets curves and the cost line). As a consequence,
this increase yields more extreme expected policy outcomes in each direction left and
right (minus and plus 0:857, 0:956, and 0:982 for our ascending n, respectively) and
raises expected entry (1:434, 1:757, and 1:832, respectively).6
6Recall that expected entry does not necessarily increase in n, but depends on the specic parameters
in this example.
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6 Concave payo¤ functions
The model can also be extended in a straightforward way to allow for a class of utility
functions that are a concave function of the Euclidean distance between a citizens ideal
point and the policy outcome. Particularly simple is the special case of power utility
functions (which includes the commonly-used specication of quadratic payo¤s), and
one can think of these utility functions as measuring the risk aversion of the players.
The payo¤ function is
i (xi; ; ei; wi; ) = jxi   j   cei + bwi; (9)
where   1.
Formally, the only di¤erence from the piecewise linear utility specication is that
the condition for the best response strategy for a voter with ideal point xi if all other
citizens are using cutpoint strategy e is now to enter if and only if
xn 1 [b+ E[jxi   j j x]]
+
nX
m=2

n  1
m  1

(1  x)m 1xn m 1
m
[b+ E [jxi   j j x]]  c: (10)
See Großer and Palfrey (2008) for the equilibrium characterization for strictly
concave utility functions.
7 Discussion and conclusions
We presented our basic citizen candidate model with private information. The paper
specializes the results of Großer and Palfrey (2008) to the case of uniformly distributed
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ideal points and the simple default policy,  = 0. We showed that equilibria with
symmetric cutpoint policies always exist and are always unique. In these equilibria, all
citizens with ideal points equally or more extreme than the cutpoint enter the electoral
competition as candidates and all citizens with more moderate ideal points do not enter.
And, we showed that the equilibrium cutpoint policy is increasing in the entry costs and
the number of citizens, and it is decreasing in the leaders benets from holding o¢ ce.
Moreover, an increase in the equilibrium cutpoint policy through changes in the entry
costs and benets from holding o¢ ce decreases the expected number of citizen
candidates and the expected policy outcome becomes more extreme. An increase in the
equilibrium cutpoint policy through an increase in the number of citizens also results in
a more extreme expected policy outcome, however, the e¤ect on the number of expected
entrants can be either positive or negative.
The results can be extended and generalized in several directions. First, one can
relax the assumption of uniformly distributed ideal points. This assumption made the
computations quite easy and allowed us to illustrate the results graphically. In Großer
and Palfrey (2008), we obtain similar results for arbitrary symmetric distributions. This
allows us to address questions about the e¤ect of polarization of the electorates
preferences on candidate entry. There, we also investigate the e¤ects of distributional
asymmetries of ideal points on the characterization of equilibrium entry strategies and
more general specications of the default policy. The model can also accommodate a
stochastic default policy, given by a distribution G.
Ideally one would like to endogenize the default policy as part of the equilibrium of
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the model. Here we used a simple exogenously specied constant default policy. In
general, one would expect the default outcome to depend in some way of the electoral
process. One way to endogenize this is to have one of the citizens randomly appointed
the new leader, in case no one runs as a candidate. This is considered in Großer and
Palfrey (2008).
Another interesting possibility for endogenizing the default policy is to allow
multiple rounds in the entry stage: if no citizen chooses to run as a candidate in the rst
entry round, another round starts and this continues until nally there is at least one
citizen candidate. Such a model of "default" policy has the virtue of guaranteeing
endogenous entry of at least one candidate, provided entry costs are not prohibitively
large. The e¤ect of this is that after the rst entry round the community can update
that there are no ideal points that are equally or more extreme than the equilibrium
cutpoint policy in the rst round. In the second entry round, the game will be solved as
the original, only that the truncated probability distribution is used, and so forth.
Several other directions extending the model could add some additional insights.
For example, in the present formulation of the model citizens do not learn anything
useful about a candidates ideal point. As a rst step it would be interesting to look at a
model where citizens can learn whether this ideal point is to the left or the right of the
median ideal point, as might happen for example if there are interest group
endorsements or party labels. Along a similar vein, one could introduce nominating
procedures or party formation of left and right candidates, with each side nominating
one as their running candidate. One could add partial credibility to the policy promises
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stage, as in Banks (1990). And nally, it might be possible to extend the model to
multiple dimensions, for example where the policy space is the closed unit ball. A
natural conjecture for well-behaved symmetric distributions is that there will exist a
unique equilibrium with similar features to the one-dimensional model: citizens enter if
and only if their ideal point is su¢ ciently far from the origin.
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